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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION - ENFORCEMENT BY PRI-
VATE PARTIES: Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir.
1976).
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed a federal
district court's dismissal of a suit seeking judicial enforcement of a
United Nations Security Council resolution. The court held that the
U.N. resolution does not confer rights on citizens of the United States
that are enforceable in court in the absence of implementing legisla-
tion.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 301,1 for which the
United States voted affirmatively, calls upon member states to have no
dealings with South Africa which impliedly recognize the legality of
South Africa's occupation of Namibia. Plaintiffs, American citizens and
Namibians, sought declaratory and injunctive relief prohibiting the
United States government from continuing to deal with South Africa
regarding the importation of seal furs from Namibia. Plaintiffs were
upset by several visits to South Africa by U.S. Department of Com-
merce officials, who were obtaining information from South African
officials with regard to a possible waiver of the Marine Mammal
Protection Act of 1972.2 Such a waiver would have allowed an Ameri-
can company, Fouke Co., to import seal furs from Namibia. Plaintiffs
contended that these contacts with South African officials represented
a violation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 301.
Plaintiffs based their claim on two major grounds. They contended
that the U.N. resolution stated a binding obligation of the United
States. Second, plaintiffs asserted that the resolution is self-executing
and therefore comprises a part of judicially enforceable
'S.C. Res. 301, 26 U.N. SCOR (1598th mtg.) 4, U.N. Doc. S/PV 1598 (1971); U.N.
Doc. S/INF/27, at 6 (1972).
216 U.S.C. § 1371 (Supp. V 1975).
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domestic law. In opposition, the Government asserted that the plain-
tiffs lacked standing and that this case presented a political question
not meant for judicial resolution. Conceding nothing on the merits, the
Government also maintained that Security Council resolutions are not
legally binding on U.N. members and that, nevertheless, this particu-
lar resolution is not self-executing.
The court grounded its decision on the reasoning that the U.N.
resolution is not self-executing. If the resolution was found to be
self-executing, then no further legislative or executive action would be
necessary to make it part of judicially enforceable domestic law. Find-
ing that neither the language nor the history of the resolution supplied
the intent that it be self-executing, 3 the court concluded that its
provisions were not addressed to the judicial branch of government.
The court noted that the resolution concerned matters traditionally left
to executive discretion. Furthermore, in the absence of domestic legis-
lation evincing an intention for judicial enforcement, the court con-
cluded that the provisions of Resolution 301 simply confer no judicially
enforceable rights upon individual citizens.
In recognizing that the plaintiffs had standing in United States
courts, the Diggs court allowed the plaintiffs to overcome a major
barrier to participation in the foreign policy process. The court reaf-
firmed that litigation is a technique of public participation in the
formulation and execution of foreign policy in a democracy.4 Although
the plaintiffs gained access to this forum, they were denied a hearing
on the merits because of another barrier: a non-self-executing resolu-
tion.
There are generally two approaches used in interpreting whether
or not a treaty is self-executing. The Diggs approach is generally
accepted. Scrutiny of the specific provisions, the draftsmen's intent,
and the domestic legislation is necessary for the determination of
self-execution. There is another approach which recognizes the special
responsibility of domestic courts to protect interests which lack effec-
tive spokesmen in the international field. 5 The court might have noted
that the resolution spoke of the "rights of the people of Namibia" and
the responsibility of United Nations members to Namibians. 6
The extent to which an international agreement establishes judi-
cially enforceable rights depends on several factors in each case.7 The
3This is the generally accepted test in determining self-execution, as stated in Sei
Fujii V. State, 38 Cal.2d 718, 721-22, 242 P.2d 617, 620 (1952); see also People of Saipan
v. United States Dep't of Interior, 502 F.2d 90, 101 (9th Cir. 1974); Henry, When is a
Treaty Self-Executing?, 27 MICH. L. REV. 776 (1929).4Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Public Interest Litigation and United
States Foreign Policy, 18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 375, 376 (1977).5See 502 F.2d 90, Public Interest Litigation, supra note 4, at 416.6E.g., in S.C. Res. 301, supra note 1, at para. 11.
7502 F.2d 90, 97.
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Diggs court found that the preponderance of the factors weighed in
favor of the conclusion that the treaty was not self-executing. How-
ever, the court failed to examine two important factors: the availability
of alternate, feasible measures of enforcement and the social conse-
quences of self-execution. A study of these factors shows that the
plaintiffs' official alternate route, the Security Council, was not feasi-
ble. Furthermore, a major consequence of finding this treaty non-self-
executing would be to provide Fouke Co. with its waiver and therefore
further enhance South Africa's role in Namibia. This result is contrary
to the language and intent of Resolution 301.
Despite the dismissal by the district court and court of appeals,
the plaintiffs succeeded in persuading the Director of National Marine
Fisheries Service that no waiver permitting the import of Namibian
seal skins be permitted. 8 This result emphasizes the irony in the
plaintiffs' case on the merits and their inability to have it heard in a
domestic court. Other public interest groups might not be so fortunate
in securing a sounding board for similar claims involving U.S. foreign
policy. Whereas the Diggs approach is generally accepted in foreign
policy litigation, it seems that a thorough examination of all relevant
factors, especially the availability of alternate measures of enforce-
ment, should also be considered in determining whether a domestic
court should assume responsibility for protection of private rights.
E. M.
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS: Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. v. Lecopulos, 553 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1977).
One of the greatest dangers of contracting with a foreign citizen is
the possibility of not being able to obtain jurisdiction over that person
in the case of a breach. State "long arm" and "doing business" statutes
alleviate this problem where the foreigner has conducted or is conduct-
ing business within the state. However, there are many instances in
which the foreign party's activity in the state is not sufficient to bring
him within these statutes. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals re-
cently held that the inclusion of an arbitration agreement in the
contract designating a United States arbitrator provides a sufficient
basis on which to find personal jurisdiction.
Merrill Lynch, Inc., a Delaware corporation with its principal place
of business in New York, opened a commodity account with Costa
Lecopulos, a Greek citizen, through a Commodity Account Agreement
negotiated by Merrill Lynch's London subsidiary. After several months
of trading, Lecopulos' account showed a debit of over one hundred
841 Fed. Reg. 10,940 (1976).
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thousand dollars ($100,000.00). Upon Lecopulos' refusal to pay, plain-
tiff instituted suit in the Supreme Court of New York to recover the
unpaid balance. Defendant removed the action to federal court on
diversity grounds, and plaintiff moved to stay the action pending
arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause in the Commodity Ac-
count Agreement.1 The district court thereafter granted defendant's
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
On appeal, plaintiff alleged three bases for the district court's
jurisdiction over the defendant. Plaintiff first asserted jurisdiction
under New York's long arm statute2 which reaches a defendant in an
action "arising from the transaction of any business within" New York.
In addition, plaintiff alleged jurisdiction under the statutory "doing
business" test 3 which requires that business actually be conducted
within the state. Plaintiff also argued that the Commodity Account
Agreement arbitration clause constituted consent by the defendant to
personal jurisdiction in the New York courts.
The court of appeals, deciding that it was unnecessary to consider
plaintiff's statutory bases for jurisdiction, upheld plaintiff's third ar-
gument relying on its decision in Victory-Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria
General4 which held that an agreement to arbitrate constitutes consent
to personal jurisdiction.
Lecopulos argued that proper service of demand for arbitration
was required to bring him within the power of the courts or arbitrators
and that he had not received such notice. The court rejected this
argument and held that the receipt of the motion to stay court action
pending arbitration was adequate notice. Defendant also contended
that plaintiff waived its right to arbitrate by filing a lawsuit rather than
proceeding directly to arbitration. The court relied on its previous
decision in Chatham Shipping Co. v. Fertex Steamship Corp. 5 and held
that filing an action in district court is not a waiver of the right to
arbitrate. The court of appeals, finding an adequate basis for the
district court's jurisdiction over Lecopulos, remanded the case to the
district court for further proceedings.
E. V.
1The Agreement provided in part:
It is agreed that any controversy between us arising out of your business or this
agreement, shall be submitted to arbitration conducted under the provisions of the
Constitution and Rules of the Board of Governors of the New York Stock Exchange.
2N. Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW (McKinney) § 302(a)(1) (1972).
31d. § 301.
4336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964).
5352 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1965).
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STANDING: Republic of Vietnam v. Pfizer, Inc., 556 F.2d 892 (8th Cir.
1977).
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recently affirmed a district
court's decision to dismiss a cause of action brought by a foreign
government against a United States corporation on the ground that the
plaintiff had ceased to exist as a government in law and in fact, and
because the United States had not as yet recognized any subsequent
government as the sovereign authority in that country.
The Republic of Vietnam filed a complaint in 1970 alleging that
defendants, certain American drug companies, had violated antitrust
laws of the United States in selling broad spectrum antibiotics. In
April 1975, the Republic of Vietnam surrendered unconditionally to
North Vietnam, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam eventually was
formed out of the former territories of plaintiff and North Vietnam. As
a result of these events, defendants filed a motion to dismiss alleging
that "the plaintiff as named and described in the amended complaint
no longer exists in any form recognizable by this court and has not
been succeeded by any government, entity or person that has the
capacity to sue in this court." 1 Without opinion, the district court
dismissed the plaintiff's suit with prejudice on December 2, 1976.
Plaintiff appealed..
The court of appeals, in citing Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 2
stated that a foreign government has no standing to sue in state or
federal court if it is not recognized by the United States. However, in
the situation where an action is commenced by a foreign government
recognized by the United States and diplomatic relations with that
government are subsequently withdrawn while the suit is pending, the
court can either dismiss the action or suspend it sine die pending
recognition of a new government. Whether to suspend or dismiss the
suit is within the court's sound discretion, and a decision to dismiss an
action will not be set aside unless there has been an abuse of this
discretion.
Plaintiff argued that the surrender of South Vietnam to North
Vietnam constitued a withdrawal of diplomatic relations and therefore
the court of appeals should be held to the abuse of discretion standard
of review. The court accepted plaintiff's argument and held that since
the United States had not recognized any government as the sovereign
authority in South Vietnam when the suit was dismissed, the district
court's dismissal of the action did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
An aspect of the case that was not put into issue on appeal but
which is likely to arise in the near future is the district court's decision
to dismiss plaintiff's suit with prejudice. Succession of foreign govern-
1556 F.2d at 894.
2304 U.S. 126 (1938).
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ments to actions commenced by their predecessors has long been
recognized by the United States since the decision in The Sapphire.3
This case concerned a collision between the American ship Sapphire
and a vessel belonging to the French navy. An action was commenced
in federal court in the name of Emperior Napoleon III against the
American owners, who subsequently lost the case. While an appeal
was pending, Napoleon III was deposed. The American appellants
argued that the suit had been abated by the removal of the Emperor.
The court of appeals disagreed, stating that the suit was brought on
behalf of the sovereign of France and not by Napoleon as an individu-
al. Therefore, a change in such representation would work no change
in the national sovereignty or its rights, and the successor, if recog-
nized by the United States, would be competent to carry on the suit
and receive the fruits of it. If the court of appeals had taken this
possibility into account, it may have found the district court's dismissal
of the action with prejudice to be an abuse of discretion.
B. H.
ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE: Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corporation, 550 F.2d 68
(2d Cir. 1977).
On the basis of the act of state doctrine, 1 the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit has affirmed a lower court decision granting a
motion to dismiss an antitrust action against several major corpora-
tions for conspiring to restrain unreasonably the foreign trade and
commerce of the United States.
Plaintiff, an independent Libyan oil producer, had an oil conces-
sion to one half of the Sarir Field which it obtained from the Libyan
government in 1957. Defendants, the seven major oil producers in the
world, 2 produced and refined oil in Libya as well as the Persian Gulf
fields. In 1971 Libya and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC), which includes the Persian Gulf fields, increased
the prices and taxes on oil production in those countries. In response to
this action, the seven major companies convened in New York and,
378 U.S. (11 Wall.) 164 (1870).
'The act of state doctrine, as conceptualized in the case of Underhill v. Hernandez, 168
U.S. 250, 252 (1897), states that:
Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other
sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of
the government of another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by
reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign
powers as between themselves.
2Mobil, Exxon, Shell, Texaco, Standard Oil, British Petroleum and Gulf.
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with the participation of the independent Libyan oil producers, includ-
ing Hunt, drafted the Libyan Producers Agreement. It provided
that if any party's crude oil production was cut back by the Libyan
government, all parties would allocate the cutback among themselves.
In addition, if Libya effected governmental restrictions or shutdowns
on production, the Persian Gulf producers would provide the Libyan
producers with sufficient oil to meet contractual obligations.
In December 1971, the Libyan government nationalized British
Petroleum's half of the Sarir Field and demanded that Hunt sell B.P.'s
share of the production on its behalf. When Hunt refused to comply,
its permissible oil production was cut back fifty percent and its person-
nel was evicted from the Sarir. Hunt and B.P. received crude oil from
the other countries pursuant to the agreement. In October 1972, the
Libyan government demanded a fifty percent equity participation in
Hunt's interest. When plaintiff again refused, the Libyan government
stopped further exports of Hunt's oil and nationalized all of Hunt's
assets.
Hunt brought the present interlocutory appeal charging that the
defendants used the above agreement to diminish competition from
Libyan oil producers by preventing the independents from reaching
agreements with Libya. The trial judge ruled that in order to find a
conspiracy the court would have to examine Libya's motives for
committing its aggressive action. Judicial inquiry into the motives of a
foreign government is foreclosed under the act of state doctrine, the
court concluded, and the antitrust claim was dismissed.
Plaintiff argued that the act of state doctrine was not applicable
here since Libya was not named as a co-conspirator in the complaint.
The court, it reasoned, would therefore not be required to pass judg-
ment on Libya's acts. A similar argument was used in Occidental
Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 3 where the plaintiffs charged
that a conspiracy involving the defendants and the Trucial State of
Sharjah had monopolized the development of certain petroleum re-
serves. The plaintiffs argued that the doctrine was inapplicable be-
cause they were complaining not of a foreign state's acts but only of
those acts of the defendants. The court stated that the plaintiffs had
"characterized" the foreign sovereigns as co-conspirators which re-
quired inquiry into Sharjah's so-called "fraudulent" decree.
In the present action, plaintiffs did not name Libya as a defendant
or co-conspirator, nor did they challenge the propriety of the govern-
ment's action. The court of appeals, however, determined that the
antitrust claim would not be viable unless it examined the motivation
of the Libyan action, and that would inevitably involve its validity. In
addition, the court took notice of the fact that the State Department
3331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd per curiam 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied 409 U.S. 950 (1972).
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had already categorized the Libyan seizure as invalid; therefore, for the
judicial branch to adjudicate the legality of Libya's action in the wake of
United States condemnation would only hinder or embarrass the
conduct of foreign relations. 4 Thus the court of appeals decided that it
would go one step further than the Occidental Petroleum Corp. decision
and apply the act of state doctrine in cases only tangentially involving
the actions of a foreign government.
B. H.
ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE: New York Times Co. v. City of New York
Commission on Human Rights, 41 N.Y.2d 345, 361 N.E.2d 963,
393 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1977).
The act of state doctrine was recently applied by the New York
Court of Appeals to overturn a municipal agency's ruling that the New
York Times violated local antidiscrimination laws by printing adver-
tisements for employment in the Republic of South Africa.
Between August 1970 and December 1973, the New York Times
published numerous advertisements of employment opportunities
available in South Africa. Although none of the advertisements con-
tained any references to racial discrimination, the American Commit-
tee on Africa and two other groups filed a complaint with the New
York Commission on Human Rights alleging that the Times violated
New York City's antidiscrimination laws.1 The complainants argued
that the advertisements indirectly expressed discrimination because
South Africa's policy of apartheid is so well known. The Commission
order the Times to cease printing the ads on the ground that the term
"South Africa" has taken on a meaning beyond that of a geographical
reference and denotes the principle of white supremacy.
In its reversal of the Commission's order, the court of appeals
went beyond interpretation of the meaning of the phrase "indirect
expression of discrimination" in the ordinance to find that the com-
4See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), for a case dealing
with the modern concept of the act of state doctrine as a defense in situations where
judicial review might interfere with the government's conduct of foreign affairs.
1New York City's antidiscrimination laws prohibit employers from printing "any
statement, advertisement, or publication [which] expresses, directly or indirectly, any
limitation, specification or discrimination as to age, race, creed, color, national origin
or sex, or any intent to make such limitation, specification or discrimination, unless
based upon a bona fide occupational qualification." New York City, N.Y., Adminis-
trative Code § B1-7.0(1)(d).
It is also unlawful "for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce the
doing of any of the acts forbidden" by the terms of the antidiscrimination laws. Id. §
B1-7.0(6).
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plainants were in fact seeking to impose an economic boycott of South
Africa. Reciting the classic statement of the act of state doctrine, 2 the
court stated that "it is beyond the province of the State courts, much
less the municipal agencies, to sit in review of the laws of foreign
governments. ' ' 3 The court thus held that the municipal agency was
without jurisdiction to create and enforce its own foreign policy and
that an economic boycott can be imposed only at the federal level.
Two judges dissented from the majority opinion's application of
the act of state doctrine. They looked at the wording of the Underhill
definition of the doctrine and determined that the phrase "within its
own territory" precludes a court from inquiring into the acts of another
country only where they have been executed within the acting state's
territory. Since the unlawful discriminatory practice of the Times was
not accomplished in South Africa but in New York instead, the
dissenters argued that the Commission was not in any way reviewing
an act of the Republic of South Africa but was merely ordering the
cessation of what it had found to be a violation of its local antidiscrimi-
nation laws.
The court of appeals decision leaves some doubt as to what
advertisements for employment in foreign countries may contain, for
the act of state doctrine might now be applied to preclude enforcement
of local antidiscrimination laws in cases where the advertisement
expresses explicit racial or other qualifications, as long as the discrimi-
nation is a legal policy of that country.
M.W.
ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE: Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America,
549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1977).
An antitrust suit involving the activities of a foreign government
was dismissed in 1974 by a district court applying the classic definition
of the act of state doctrine.1 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
recently overturned this decision after an extensive analysis of the act
of state doctrine in which it concluded that the modern concept of the
doctrine does not provide absolute immunity for all conduct in which a
foreign government is involved.
2
"Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other
sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of
the government of another done within its own territory." Underhill v. Hernandez,
168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
3361 N.E.2d at 968.
1Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Timberland Lumber Company [Timberland], a United States cor-
poration, purchased a lumber mill in Honduras subject to an all
inclusive mortgage held by the Tegucigalpa branch of the Bank of
America Corporation. The bank refused Timberlane's offers to pur-
chase or settle the outstanding mortgage and instead sold it to one of
Timberlane's competitors with whom it had close financial ties. A
court-ordered attachment of the property was subsequently secured by
the competitor to enforce the mortgage. Under Honduran law, the
court appointed a judicial officer, called an "interventor," to ensure
against any diminution in the value of the property. Acting through
the interventor, the competitor harrassed and sabotaged the Timber-
lane milling operation.
Timberlane brought suit under the Sherman Act 2 against the bank
and others alleging that they conspired to prevent Timberlane from
milling lumber in order to maintain control of the Honduran lumber
business in the hands of a few select individuals. The district court,
pursuant to the classic application of the act of state doctrine, dis-
missed the suit on the ground that plaintiff's injury resulted from the
Honduran government's enforcement of the mortgage provisions.
The court of appeals rejected the district court's application of the
act of state doctrine and applied instead the modern concept of the
doctrine as it is stated in the leading case of Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino. 3 According to this view, the act of state doctrine derives from
the judiciary's concern for its possible interference with the govern-
ment's conduct of foreign affairs rather than its recognition of each
country's sovereignty. The court cited Sabbatino for the proposition that
a balancing of relevant considerations should be used to determine
whether judicial review is appropriate, with the potential for interfer-
ence with foreign relations being the critical element in determining
whether deference should be accorded in any given case. The availabil-
ity of the act of state doctrine as a defense will then depend upon the
court's calculation of the depth and nature of the foreign government's
interest in the matter under review.
Applying these principles, the court of appeals held that the act of
state doctrine did not require dismissal of the plaintiff's suit because
the principal interests involved in the case were those of private
individuals and not those of the state. 4 Since the Honduran govern-
215 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
3376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964). "The doctrine as formulated in past decisions expresses
the strong sense of the Judicial Branch that its engagement in the task of passing on
the validity of foreign acts of state may hinder rather than further this country's
pursuit of goals both for itself and for the community of nations as a whole in the
international sphere."
4See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 41,
Comment (d) (1965).
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ment's actions were limited solely to judicial proceedings initiated by
private parties rather than actions involving Honduran public in-
terests, the court concluded that judicial review of the alleged conspir-
acy would not threaten foreign relations between the United States
and Honduras.
E.V.
LONGSHOREMEN'S AND HARBOR WORKERS' COMPENSA-
TION ACT: Munoz v. Flota Merchante Granacolombiana, 553 F.2d
837 (2d Cir. 1977). Hurst v. Triad Shipping Co., 554 F.2d 1237 (3d
Cir. 1977).
Prior to 1972, the meager benefits paid injured workers under the
exclusive liability provision of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Work-
ers' Compensation Act' resulted in suits by the workers against the
shipowners based on the strict liability doctrine of unseaworthiness.
These suits, in turn, led to indemnity actions by the shipowners
against the workers' employers. The 1972 amendment to section 905(b)
of the Act eliminates the shipowners' liability under the unseaworthi-
ness doctrine and makes them liable only for injuries caused by their
own negligence. Furthermore, the amendment prohibits recovery by
the shipowners against the employers. These changes limiting the
liability of both shipowners and stevedoring companies were the
subject of two recent cases, one involving the determination of a
shipowner's liability based on negligence and the other challenging the
constitutionality of the amendment.
In Munoz v. Flota Merchante Granacolombiana, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals held that an injury to a longshoreman caused by a
faulty pathway constructed by his fellow workers did not make the
shipowner liable under section 905(b) of the Act. Plaintiff argued that
although the shipowner did not create the dangerous condition nor did
he know of its existence, he should have in the exercise of reasonable
care discovered and corrected the condition. The court rejected this
argument, stating that the shipowner had no duty to supervise the
work since he relinquished control of the vessel to an experienced
stevedore under a contract to provide services within its normal
competence. The court of appeals followed the standard articulated in
section 413 of the Restatement (Second), of Torts 2 and held that the
shipowner had exercised reasonable care and was therefore not liable
to the worker for his injuries.
133 U.S.C. § 905(b) (Supp. II 1972).
2Section 413 deals with the duty of an employer to take special precautions where
the work involved is likely to create a peculiar risk of physical harm to others.
Comment (b) to this section states that if the employer has exercised reasonable care to
employ a competent contractor, he is not required to take routine precautions which
any careful contractor would reasonably take.
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In Hurst v. Triad Shipping Co., which involved facts similar to
Munoz, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals entertained arguments
questioning the constitutionality of the amendment to section 905(b)
eliminating the worker's action under the doctrine of unseaworthiness.
Plaintiff argued that the abolition of the warranty of seaworthiness was
an unconstitutional exercise of congressional power because Article III,
section 2 of the U.S. Constitution 3 requires the incorporation into the
Constitution of the rules of general maritime law.
In holding that the amendment to section 905(b) was constitu-
tional, the court of appeals refused to acknowledge that the
longshoreman's right to sue the shipowner for unseaworthiness was
"clearly within" the maritime law in a constitutional sense. The court
noted that Congress probably could not remove from admiralty juris-
diction those types of accidents that are "conceptually, traditionally,
and constitutionally admiralty matters." The amendment to section
905(b), however, does not prohibit an injured worker from proceeding
against the shipowner. It only changes the nature of his cause of
action. Thus the court reaffirmed Congress' power to alter the jurisdic-
tion and reformulate the substantive rules of liability in maritime law.
E. V.
RECIPROCITY UNDER THE PUBLIC VESSELS ACT: United Conti-
nental Tuna Corp. v. United States, 550 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1977).
The Public Vessels Act' authorizes suit against the United States
for damages caused by public vessels of the United States 2 but bars
such suits by citizens of a foreign government that will not allow
United States nationals to sue in its courts under similar cir-
cumstances. 3 A group of American citizens owning a Philippine corpo-
ration recently felt the bite of this provision when the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit upheld the dismissal of their suit under the Act
for failure to satisfy the reciprocity requirement.
Eight American citizens formed United Continental Tuna Corpora-
tiontion [Tuna], a Philippine corporation, for the purpose of gaining
access to fishing rights in Philippine waters. The corporation's only asset,
a fishing vessel, sank after being struck by a United States destroyer.
Tuna filed suit under the Public Vessels Act to recover damages for the
loss of the vessel. The United States District Court for the Central District
of California dismissed the action on the ground that the corporation had
3
"The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases... of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction..."
146 U.S.C. §§ 781-90 (1975).
21d. § 781.
31d. § 785.
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failed to satisfy the reciprocity requirement of section 785 of the Act,
because it could not establish that the Philippine government would allow
American citizens to sue in its courts.
On appeal, Tuna, attempting to circumvent the reciprocity re-
quirement, argued that it was by ownership an American corporation,
and therefore the court should pierce the corporate veil and accord it
the rights and liabilities of an American shipowner. Plaintiff cited as
authority for its argument Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis,4 a Jones Act s
case which involved a suit by an injured Greek seaman against a
corporate shipowner. The corporaton was owned and managed by a
Greek citizen domiciled in New York. The Supreme Court upheld
jurisdiction, finding that the shipowner had contacts with the United
States substantial and significant enough to allow the court to disre-
gard its corporate nationality.
The court of appeals rejected plaintiff's argument on the basis of
the differences between the legislative purposes of the two acts. The
Jones Act was enacted for the sole benefit of seamen injured while in
the course of their employment, whereas the Public Vessels Act was
created to remove from the United States the defense of sovereign
immunity in cases involving damages caused by United States vessels.
The court concluded that extending the jurisdictional reach through
the "contacts test" furthers the protective design of the Jones Act but
does not further the purpose of the Public Vessels Act to remove the
sovereign immunity defense.
The court of appeals decision in United Continental enforcing the
reciprocity requirement of section 785 should be a warning to Ameri-
cans incorporating shipping interests abroad that they should take into
account in their decision to incorporate the possibility of contacts with
United States vessels and the potential for casualties arising from these
contacts. Plaintiffs incorporated in the Philippines to acquire certain rights
accorded to Philippine citizens, as well as to qualify for incentives estab-
lished by Congress to encourage Americans to invest in underdeveloped
countries. Their failure to discover the reciprocity requirement of section
785 left them without any recourse in American courts for the destruction
of their only asset.
E.V.
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: Canadian Transport Company v. United
States, 430 F. Supp. 1168 (D.D.C. 1977).
In 1960, Congress added to the Suits in Admiralty Act' a provision
waiving the federal government's sovereign immunity in certain situa-
4398 U.S. 306 (1970).
546 U.S.C. § 688 (1975).
146 U.S.C. § 741 (1970). "No vessel owned by the United States... shall be subject
to arrest or seizure by judicial process in the United States."
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tions where a parallel private action in admiralty could be maintained.
In a recent action brought under this provision, the charterers of a ship
sued the United States for damages incurred when their vessel was
denied entry into an American port. In dismissing the action, the
District Court for the District of Columbia expressed a new interpreta-
tion of section 742 of the Suits in Admiralty Act, and clarified the
instances in which suits under the Act will be successful.
Plaintiffs, the foreign charterers of a Swiss-owned vessel, had
arranged to have their ship sail from Rotterdam to Spain via Norfolk,
Virginia, where it was to take on a shipment of coal. The United States
Coast Guard, pursuant to a national security program, denied the
plaintiffs' request to enter the port of Norfolk because the ship's
officers were Polish nationals. As a result of this action, plaintiffs had
to sail to another port and replace their crew with one that would be
allowed to enter the port. Plaintiffs commenced this action to recover
the expenses caused by these detours and delays.
Plaintiffs' first cause of action was brought under section 742 of the
Suits in Admiralty Act, which provides for the waiver of sovereign
immunity in cases involving private persons or property "where a
proceeding in admiralty could be maintained." Faced with an unil-
luminating legislative history and a scarcity of relevant cases, the
district court looked to an analogous statute, the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 2 for principles by which to govern the application of the waiver
provision. Decisions under this Act indicate that sovereign immunity is
waived by the federal government only where there is an analagous
private activity giving rise to the liability. 3 The district court deter-
mined that the governmental decision to deny entry to the plaintiffs'
vessel was a "uniquely governmental activity" and not one that aprivate party would ever be in a position to perform. The court
therefore dismissed plaintiffs' suit for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted.
In reaching this decision, the court considered the type of gov-
ernmental activity covered by the Suits in Admiralty Act. Relying on
the case of Gercey v. United States, 4 the court determined that only
governmental activity on an operational or nondiscretionary level is
covered by the Act, whereas activity on a planning or discretionary
level is not subject to the Act. The court stated that if the governmental
activity in question had been based on a decision made on the planning
level, it would have dismissed the case under the "discretionary
action" exception, and if the activity had been based on a decision
determined on the operational level, it would have dismissed the suit
228 U.S.C. § 2674 (1970).
3Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
4540 F.2d 536, 539 (1976).
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under the "uniquely governmental action" exception. Thus, the court
never had to determine what type of governmental activity was actu-
ally involved.
Plaintiffs' second cause of action was based on a violation by the
United States of the Convention on Facilitation of International
Maritime Traffic. 5 In considering this issue, the district court stated
that a treaty may contain provisions conferring rights on citizens of the
member countries which can be enforced by the courts for the benefit
of private parties. Without such a provision, however, the individual
has no legal recourse against the government for failure to observe the
terms of the treaty. The United States could therefore disregard the
provisions and enforcement of the treaty in question without having to
answer in court to private parties claiming to have been adversely
affected.
B. H.
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS PRACTICES: The United Nations
Commission on Transnational Corporations: Ad Hoc Inter-
governmental Working Group on Corrupt Practices.
After several months of sessions conducted to review options and
recommendations on curbing international corrupt business practices,
the Intergovernmental Working Group on Corrupt Practices has com-
piled and presented a draft text of a report to the United Nations
Economic and Social Council [ ECOSOC] at its July-August meeting.
The Group has recommended that ECOSOC convene a diplomatic
convention of plenipotentiaries to finalize an international agreement
designed to eliminate and prevent illicit payments practiced by various
corporations in international commercial transactions.
Basically, the text of the report issued by the Group provides as
follows: each State participating in the agreement promises to "ensure
that bribery in connection with international commercial transactions
are criminal offenses under its national law and provide criminal
penalties therefor." Definitions of key terms, such as "illicit pay-
ments," "bribery" and "other corrupt practices" have not been agreed
upon by the special working group.
Central issues yet to be resolved by the Group are two-fold: (1)
setting procedural standards for reporting and disclosure of payments
made by corporations to secure international deals, and (2) establishing
"measures against the payments of royalties and taxes to illegal minor-
ity regimes in southern Africa in contravention of United Nations
resolutions." The report is expected to be published in full by late
October.
-Opened for signature April 9,1965,18 U.S.T. 411, T.I.A.S. No. 6251, 591 U.N.T.S.
265 (entered into force for United States May 16,. 1967).
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The United Nations made international corrupt practices a prime
concern in December 1975, when the General Assembly con-
demned "all corrupt practices, including bribery, by transnational and
other corporations, their intermediaries and others involved in viola-
tion of the laws and regulations of the host countries." ECOSOC was
called upon by the Assembly to direct its Commission on Transnational
Corporations to examine corrupt practices of transnational enterprises
and to recommend preventive measures in dealing with such practices.
As a result, the Group was established in August 1976 by
ECOSOC to investigate and set up guidelines for dealing with the
growing dilemma of corrupt practices by global corporations. A report
was to be issued by the Group to the Council in July or August 1977, to
enable ECOSOC to present its recommendations to the General As-
sembly for final action. At the same time that Group was conducting its
investigation, the Intergovernmental Working Group on a Code of
Conduct, a subcommittee of the Commission on Transnational Corpo-
rations, was scheduled to formulate a code of conduct for transnational
corporations. The Commission is expected to consider a final text of a
draft code at its fourth session in 1978.
B.H.
1977 WORLD BANK UPDATE.
In its annual report for fiscal 1977, the World Bank, with its
affiliates, the International Development Association and the Interna-
tional Finance Corporation, reported that it had made lending and
investment commitments totaling $7,273.5 million - an increase of
$396.1 million over fiscal 1976. Of this amount, $2,172.5 million went to
countries with annual per capita income of less than $265 - a drop of
$387 million from 1976. Agriculture and rural development received
the most assistance in fiscal 1977 as in the past two years, and estimates
indicate that 5 million families or about 30 million people directly
benefit from these projects.
The annual report for 1977 discussed changing policies and direc-
tions in World Bank activities. Generally, the Bank has found that the
benefits of growth cannot be assumed to "trickle down" automatically.
The focus of Bank activity has been shifted to identifying the poorest
sectors of society and deliberately directing projects at these sectors.
For instance, financing for industrialization has been shifted to small-
scale enterprises. The Bank has found that these enterprises create
more unskilled jobs and do more for indirect employment than larger
enterprises. The Bank will aid the small-scale enterprises in dealing
with their major problems of marketing and finance by channeling
funds through intermediaries in the recipient countries.
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During fiscal 1976, a panel of experts submitted a report examining
all aspects of the Bank's population policy. The panel found that
fertility may have started to decline generally throughout the develop-
ing world. The problem facing the Bank is to identify those policies and
programs which have a critical influence on the number of children.
Already the report has had an impact on Bank policy, with population
factors receiving greater emphasis in Bank programs.
The Bank also reviewed its rural development projects which have
been implemented since Bank policy on this issue was set forth in 1975.
The Bank concluded that it is possible to design projects that will assist
large numbers of rural poor to expand production and increase in-
come, but the problems confronting this effort are formidable. A
crucial factor in determining the success of these programs is the
degree of commitment which the local government has toward a policy
of rural development. The Bank candidly admits that it still has much
to learn.
The Bank decided to undertake an analysis of major development
issues in order to promote their better understanding in both the
industrialized and developing countries. This analysis will be underta-
ken in close consultation with the International Monetary Fund and it
is hoped that a draft report will be prepared by early in fiscal 1979.
R. K.
BUY AMERICAN ACTS: K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dis-
trict Water Supply Commission, 75 N.J. 272, 381 A.2d 774 (1977).
The New Jersey Supreme Court recently dismissed a challenge to
New Jersey's "Buy American" Act. 1 In upholding the statute, the court
rejected arguments: 1) that such a law was in violation of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); 2 2) that the law was an imper-
missible interference with the constitutional right of the federal govern-
ment to conduct foreign affairs; and 3) that the law constituted a state
action prohibited by the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution.
The North Jersey District Water Supply Commission had solicited
bids for the construction of a water treatment plant, specifying that such
bids be made in accordance with the New Jersey "Buy American" Act.
The Act required that "only manufactured products of the United
States, wherever available, shall be used in the work."' 3 K.S.B. Technical
Sales Corp., the New York subsidiary of a West German manufacturer
of water pumping equipment, and Linda Fagio, a taxpayer and resident
of the North Jersey Water District, challenged that restriction.
'N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:33-letseq. (West 1974).
2 61 Stat., pt. 5 (1947) (original text), T.I.A.S. No. 1700.
3 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52: 33-1 (West 1974).
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 289
The plaintiffs argued that the statute conflicted with Article III of the
GATT, which provides in part: "Products of the territory of any contract-
ing party imported into the territory of any other party shall be accorded
treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like products in respect
of all laws ... affecting their internal sale .... ,,4 The court decided,
however, that this provision did not apply to the present situation,
citing the governmental purpose exemption also found in Article III.
"The provisions of this article shall not apply to laws ... governing the
procurement by governmental agencies of products purchased for gov-
ernmental purposes and not with a view to commercial resale or with a
view to use in the production of goods for commercial sale."5 The court
explained that the purchase of components for a water plant involved a
governmental purpose, and that the sale of water was not a commercial
sale. 6
The court also found that the Act was not an unconstitutional state
action derogating from the federal government's right to conduct
foreign affairs. Relying upon the test enunciated in Zschernig v. Miller,
7
the court found no significant and direct impact by the state statute
upon foreign affairs. The court analyzed factors which courts had used
in the past to strike down such state statutes, and found none present
here. No discrimination was present in the Act which restricted or pro-
hibited purchases from countries with unfavored political ideologies
(e.g., communism). It did not absolutely require that only U.S. goods be
used, but merely encouraged their use "whenever available." 8 The court
implied that this allowed the state to make a "reasonable" foreign
purchase if competitive U.S. products were not available. It concluded
that state statutes touching on foreign affairs are not invalid merely
because of such a touching. 9
The court discussed the commerce clause objection, noting the dis-
tinction between state regulation of activity in the private sector and the
entry of a state itself into the market place as a purchaser of goods. 10
Using this distinction, the court found that the water commission
purchases in carrying out its public purpose did not offend the com-
merce clause.
In a footnote,11 the court noted that the New Jersey "Buy Ameri-
can" Act seemed consistent with federal policy because it was similar in
4 GATT, pt. II, art. III, § 4; 62 Stat. 3681 (1948).
5 Id. § 8(a), 62 Stat. at 3681.
6 75 N.J. at _ 381 A.2d at 779-82.
7 389 U.S. 429 (1968). See also, Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947); Bethlehem Steel
Corp. v. Board of Comm'rs of Dep't of Water & Power, 276 Cal. App. 2d 221, 80 Cal. Rptr.
800 (Ct. App. 1969).
8 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52: 32-1 (West 1974).
9 75 N.J. at-., 381 A.2d at 785.
10 Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
11 75 N.J. at- n.6, 381 A.2d at 784 n.6.
